This study examines how mandatory IFRS adoption influences international investors" ownership and decisions. Based on a sample of French firms listed on the SBF 120 stock index, we find that international accounting harmonization leads to attract foreign equity to France. Investors become more confident and transactions are more transparent, which facilitates decision making. We try also to understand the characteristics and influence of governance mechanisms as means of IFRS enforcement. We show that the change in foreign institutional holdings depends on effective enforcement. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not all efficient in enforcing these standards in France. Indeed, a high audit quality represents a key factor which can help firms to attract non domestic shareholders, but the passivity of the independent board members is clear for the French companies of our sample.
Introduction
Following the international harmonization program, the European Union has imposed on its member states the adoption of the IFRS since the 1 st of January, 2005 (EC REGULATION NO.1606 /2002 . Even if the process of their adoption is complex and their cost is quite high, especially in Europe where this project has had an unequal cost in the world (Pébereau & Gil, 2014) , the application of these standards has undeniable benefits (decreasing earnings" management, improving stock liquidity, reducing capital cost, etc) to several users and mainly to investors. Therefore, we try to study the impact of the IFRS adoption on the decisions of foreign institutional investors. Moreover, we look on its effect on the mitigation of the informational asymmetry problem between domestic and foreign institutional investors. Institutional investors are, according to Brancato (1997) , investors, rather than individuals, who manage funds in a professional manner within an institution or for the account of their clients. We are interested in this category of actors thanks to their growing economic importance worldwide and especially in the French firms" equity. In addition, they have an important role in the financial information channel and are very active in the corporate governance process. The interest given to information quality is certainly associated to the efficiency of control mechanisms. Indeed, the IFRS seem to be beneficial only if they are appropriately implemented and enforced.
Using a sample of 120 French listed firms during the period 2002-2012, we find that the mandatory IFRS adoption had resulted in an important attraction of foreign investors. Opacity resulting from the information differential between domestic and foreign investors will be avoided thanks to the IFRS application. These standards facilitate the comparability of the firms" financial statements in different countries. They make the information more understandable and familiar to foreign funds, which encourages them to be more active at the international level. We try to understand the characteristics and influence of governance mechanisms as a means of IFRS enforcement. The IFRS, as components of the regulatory environment, are also considered as one of corporate governance mechanisms and at the same time a solution to promote governance quality. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not all efficient in enforcing these standards in France. While the role of the big4 firms has been generally approved, confirming the predictions of the agency theory and the positive accounting theory, independent board members are inefficient in terms of managers" control and monitoring, in agreement with the entrenchment theory consequences. Despite a growing popularity, the literature has not arrived at a consensus on the theoretical foundations of this phenomenon yet. Thus, this field remains open to new research. Basically, the literature is checking the possible superiority of the IFRS over local ones. Bagaeva (2008) conducted a study on the relationship between the IFRS and foreign investors in the Russian context, whereas in the French context there has not been, to the best of our knowledge, any studies conducted on this subject yet. Our study comes as an extension of the work of Bradshaw et al. (2004) , in the American context, who were the first to have studied the relationship between the institutional stock ownership and the firms" accounting choices in general. Then came the study of Covrig et al. (2007) , as well as Florou and Pope (2012) , who treated the voluntary adoption of the IFRS in association with foreign institutional investors. Other emerging studies have analyzed the relationship between the IFRS and institutional investment according to the determinants of investment decisions, including domestic bias, comparability, familiarity, etc.
In 2002, IAS standards became IFRS. This change in terminology introduced by the IASB was not neutral (Colasse, 2006) . It actually reflected an interest in the financial reporting system: "pro-investors." Nowadays, institutional investors occupy an increasingly prominent role on the world economic scene. They hold today a high fraction of firms" equity. For example, in France, their part increased in 2013 to more than 32% of the French stock equity of the CAC 40 index (Dsu et al., 2014) . Hence, this work will provide an additional insight on a subject that is still not sufficiently discussed in France. Indeed, in the French context, only few studies have contributed to the understanding of this phenomenon. In addition, given the institutional differences of France, it is not certain that the American results are applicable to the French market. In fact, France is a euro-continental country that offers a low investors" protection. It has also imposed since 1966 a mandatory joint audit (Huber, 2011) and a mandate of 6 years to auditors to improve the audit quality. It is also a first-time IFRS adopter. Indeed, French firms did not have the possibility to voluntary adopt the IFRS before 2005. Our paper emerges from the singularity of the French context on the information policy and the accounting system based on a governance partnership approach. Indeed, with the particular legislation and characteristics of French companies, our study can bring new explanations related to IFRS application. It allows us also to verify to what extent the lessons learned from American and international studies remain applicable to the French context. The research aims to explain to what extent IFRS will protect the investors" interests in ensuring value creation to shareholders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the literature review and develop the hypotheses to be tested. In the third section, we describe the empirical methodology. In the last section, we discuss our empirical findings and draw the conclusions.
Theoretical Background
Serving the shareholders" interests, mainly the investors", is the main concern of international standard-setters when preparing new accounting standards. Indeed, the internationalization of financial markets requires investors to compare firms from various countries to be able to effectively constitute well balanced portfolios. They need to understand the firms" standards and languages of the countries where they decide to invest so that they can make their choice. Financial statements represent an essential resource for investors despite their limitations. Accordingly, the adoption of a common set of accounting standards worldwide is supposed to facilitate the task of analysts, creditors and investors. Moreover, the relevance of accounting documents is mainly based on their degree of usefulness to investors.
IFRS Adoption and Foreign Institutional Investment
Referring to the positive accounting theory, the primary role of financial information is to lead to better resource allocation (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Bushman & Smith, 2001 ). Therefore, the investors" ultimate objective is to find a placement of their shares that reports more profit. They are based on information to choose the correct decision. IFRS standards are inspired by accounting rules used in the Anglo-Saxon context, which gives too much importance to investors (shareholder approach). The IFRS adoption is perceived as a good signal because they meet the investors" needs relative to information, reduce uncertainty and facilitate decision-making for the international allocation of their assets. The institutional investors" detention of large proportions of firms" stock equity explains their informational requirement and their preference for firms that adopt IFRS as well as their active attitude and their desire to control the managers" shares. This attitude is regarded as a positive signal to the market since it allows resolving agency conflicts.
The internationalization of capital markets and the adoption of the IFRS will undoubtedly attract international investors toward firms of adopting countries. For the case of French firms, they are known by concentrated ownership (controlled by the State or by large individual or family investors) (Finet et al., 2005) , but since 2005 ijef.ccsenet.org International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 8, No. 11; their adoption of IFRS have inevitably led to a variation in their ownership structures as a result of the massive arrival of foreign investors. It is clearly evident that investors avoid systematically the less transparent countries. However, the fear of foreign institutional investors towards opacity does not necessarily imply a preference of domestic investors to opacity (Gelos & Wei, 2005) . In this context, transparency represents a way for several countries not only to attract investors and reduce stock market volatility, but also to mitigate the severity of financial crises. By analyzing the relationship between the mandatory IFRS adoption and the foreign listing, Chen et al. (2014) confirmed that firms adopting the IFRS recorded a higher and more intense listing of their securities on international markets. They stipulated that firms belonging to countries under the IFRS standards were more likely to list their shares in countries applying the IFRS and in those with more liquid and large markets. Bradshaw et al. (2004) were the first to have studied the relationship between the ownership of institutional investors and the accounting choices of firms. Then came the study of Covrig et al. (2007) , who analyzed the property of 25,000 pension funds in 29 countries between 1999 and 2002. They showed that the voluntary adoption of the IFRS by non-U.S. companies had a positive impact on the ownership of foreign pension funds. Several previous studies compared the investors" preferences for firms that voluntarily adopted the IFRS to those that pursued the adoption of national standards (Beneish & Yohn, 2008) , i.e. whether the investors preferred familiar standards or high quality standards.
A study conducted by Bagaeva (2008) examined the international investors" impact on the accounting information quality in Russia. It showed that the presence of foreign investors in the ownership structure of Russian companies might lead to a better quality of information and would encourage IFRS adoption. Thus, serving the international investors" interests has been expected to promote information quality and to improve transparency. The need to attract foreign investors has led managers to adopt the IFRS and pushed them to give a better performance. Investors have responded to information disclosure following the IFRS by rebalancing their portfolios. Those relying more on the fundamental analysis or accounting data (foreign investors, investors focused on firm"s value) use the IFRS financial statements to buy or sell some specific shares (much more than with pre-IFRS financial statements) and generally increase their participation in these companies after the IFRS adoption (Florou & Pope, 2012) .
IFRS Role in the Reduction of Information Asymmetry between Foreign and Domestic Investors
According to Portes and Rey (2005) , informational flows represented a key factor of international transactions. However, investors wanted to be able to differentiate between companies in order to take the best investment decision.
Comparability of Information and Foreign Institutional Investors
The main motivation to apply the IFRS standards, according to the Regulation (EC No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament) is the comparability. The "Financial Accounting Standards Board" FASB (1980) , defines comparability as the quality of information that allows users to identify the similarities and differences between two economic phenomena. The IFRS adoption is supposed to provide a uniformity of financial statements and help investors to judge the firms" performance located in different countries. This can influence foreign investors" decisions. Indeed, given that standards differ from one country to another, the use of a single set everywhere in the world increases comparability (Yu, 2009; Khurana & Michas, 2011; Shima & Gordon, 2011; DeFond et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2012; Brochet et al., 2013; Hamberg et al., 2013) . The study of Brochet et al. (2013) , conducted on the English context, concluded that private information is reduced thanks to a rise in comparability resulting from the IFRS adoption. In addition, Hamberg et al. (2013) examined the foreign investors" ownership variation in Sweden. They concluded that comparability would reduce information cost to investors specifying that its effect might depend on the country. The uniformity of accounting standards, brought by the IFRS, was not enough to attract more foreign investors. A credible establishment was suggested to ensure a real comparability. Holthausen (2009) stipulated that the IFRS enforcement represented an important factor for these standards to increase information comparability. Beneish and Yohn (2008) concluded that foreign investment growth in a country using the IFRS standards derived in part from the comparability that facilitated the interpretation of financial statements.
By studying the IAS 27 impact on the level of firm investment efficiency, Hsu et al. (2015) found that foreign investors were increasing their holdings in the Taiwanese companies after the adoption of the IAS 27. In addition, Fang et al. (2015) studied the institutional investors" impact on the convergence of accounting practices. Indeed, the investors" requirement for comparable information, as well as their active role in corporate governance, may encourage the adoption of uniform standards between countries. Nevertheless, these actors can remain passive and simply choose firms known by good information quality.
IFRS and Increase in Familiarity for Foreign Investors
Familiarity can be defined as the tendency to concentrate shares in a familiar market in terms of geographical and professional proximity, which the investor has occupied for a long period of time (Massa & Simonov, 2006) . It is also the preference to hold assets on which we are more informed (Bhattacharya & Groznik, 2008) . Foreign institutional investors, because of the geographical distance and the non familiarity with local standards, are disadvantaged compared to their domestic investors who have better knowledge of their country firms. The earlier literature has explained that the investors" fear to diversify their portfolios is caused, among other things, by the non familiarity with local standards. It results in an informational advantage of domestic investors. A lot of authors explain home bias by the familiarity factor (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Huberman, 2001; Chan et al., 2005; Loughran & Schultz, 2005; Bhattacharya & Groznik, 2008) . In this framework, Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008) considered this bias as multi-dimensional since it could be explained either by country of residence (French & Poterba, 1991) or by geographic proximity (El Ghoul et al., 2013) , physical distance (Tesar & Werner, 1995) , language (Hau, 2001) , race (Tootell, 1996) , religion , patriotism (Morse & Shive, 2011), etc. Loughran and Schultz (2005) stipulated that a good part of information was only accessible to the investors who were physically close to the company. According to French and Poterba (1991) , familiarity shaped the decisions of foreign investment. It increased the investors" capacity to better understand the investment environment. It enhanced the investors" competence to analyze foreign market opportunities, which actually raise international investment (Huberman, 2001; Graham et al., 2009; Amiram, 2012) . The role of the IFRS standards was important to establish familiar information at the international level.
Amiram (2012) stipulated that familiarity with accounting standards was as important as that with other factors such as country of origin, language or legal origin, and colonial past. This author constructed a familiarity index which took into consideration these four variables of familiarity used by Laporta et al. (1998) . He examined the interaction between familiarity with the accounting standards and other factors. He concluded that the 'accounting familiarity' would influence the portfolios of foreign investment much more than the other factors. Covrig et al. (2007) stipulated that information disclosure in a familiar form reduced information cost for foreign investors. Hamberg et al. (2013) considered familiarity and information asymmetry as explanatory factors to the home bias phenomenon. They presented the IFRS adoption as a proxy of familiarity, which was one of the main factors that increased foreign ownership.
According to Bradshaw et al. (2004) , familiar accounting methods could make information more comprehensible to foreign investors. Yu (2014) showed that implicit barriers to foreign investment (such as lack of familiarity) played a more important role in cross-border investment decisions than explicit barriers (such as capital control) (Tesar & Werner, 1995) . Yu and Wahid (2014) defined the accounting distance as the difference between the accounting standards used in an investor country and the ones where he intended to invest. The same authors asked whether this distance affected the decision for the allocation of pensions, funds and assets. They concluded that the trend of under investment in businesses using different accounting standards would weaken significantly when the accounting distance decreased after the adoption of the IFRS. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Mandatory IFRS adoption positively influences foreign institutional investors' holdings.
Role of Corporate Governance in Relationship between IFRS and Foreign Institutional Investors
It is not sure that the IFRS adoption is the main cause of improvement of the information afforded to investors.
Other regulatory and institutional changes may play a more prominent role. The IFRS impact is, indeed, conditioned by the existence of a real enforcement of these standards, as well as by large differences between the IFRS and local standards (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Florou & Pope, 2012) . However, the effectiveness of corporate governance practices must be examined in respect with the institutional context and firm"s ownership structure (Desender et al., 2016) . The corporate governance represents a means to compel the good application of the IFRS. To do this, it requires certain mechanisms, both internal (such as board of directors and ownership structure) and external (such as institutional environment and external audit). These mechanisms are inter-related, and to be effective and relevant, they require certain combinations.
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International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 8, No. 11; The mechanisms employed by domestic investors in a stakeholder-oriented context are not able to solve the agency problems facing foreign investors in shareholder-oriented countries (Desender et al., 2016) . Foreign institutional investors can opt for mechanisms that are used to effectively control their funds and to reduce the fraud risk in financial statements. The presence of high audit quality and the existence of a board with independent members are effectively some of these mechanisms. The ownership structure largely held by institutional investors can increase the information quality published by firms. Dahlquist et al. (2003) suggested that there was a close relationship between the firm"s corporate governance and the portfolio composition held by foreign investors. Gillan and Starks (2003) stressed the importance of the role played by institutional investors, particularly foreign ones, in improving the corporate governance practices in the world. As to Gianelli and Laeven (2009), they showed in the Swedish context that the local pension funds would act well not only on control but also on the firm"s value. In the Korean context, Kim et al. (2010) tried to check if the firm"s efforts in terms of corporate governance would attract foreign capital. They found a positive association between foreign institutional investors" ownership and governance quality. In addition, Agrawal et al. (2011) examined the association between institutional investors and corporate governance. They concluded that these actors were channels of good governance practices across countries. However, Ferreira and Matos (2008) indicated that foreign investors would positively affect the firm"s performance and value, but their impact was not significant on governance. Moreover, compared to local investors, foreign investors had greater incentives to affect the governance of the firm where they invested, or indirectly by the exercise of a pressure on prices, or via a direct intervention (He et al., 2014) . Moreover, other authors confirmed a positive relationship between institutional holdings, external directors" proportion (Bathala & Rao, 1995) and audit quality (Velury et al., 2003) .
IFRS, Board of Directors" Independence and Foreign Institutional Equity
The board of directors is also responsible for the improvement of the information quality available to investors. Indeed, a firm"s board, composed by independent members, will reassure foreign institutional investors regarding the reduction of agency conflicts within the firm. Thanks to this mechanism, the manager is under pressure not to disclose information which can induce investors to make mistakes on the actual performance of the company where they wish to place their funds. A supervisory role of the board of directors has been the object of numerous studies of corporate governance (such as Adams et al., 2010) . Jensen and Meckling (1976) also argued that an impartial evaluation of managers would occur more easily if the directors were independent from the direction (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Desender et al., 2016) . Two boards with the same proportion of independent directors would not necessarily guarantee the same effective control. It was essential to realize that these independent directors could have different incentives and skills to monitor. Furthermore, some independent directors might be less focusing on the role of monitoring and more on the role of the council, which would reduce both their incentives and the capacity of monitoring (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Desender et al., 2016) .
Institutional investors can have an impact on the functioning of the board of directors (Parrat, 2003; Pérez, 2003) . Indeed, in France, the independence of this internal mechanism is not always respected. Most of the directors occupy themselves the position of the president of the board (Yeo, 2003) . By contrast, in the United States, shareholder activism focuses on the board independence, in respect to the majority of independent directors and in function of its separation within the board. The disciplinary power of the managers can influence, in a complementary way to the IFRS, the quality of information disclosed by the firm, and thus attract international institutional investors. Similarly, as important shareholders in the company, these investors affect the board composition and generally tend to place their representatives. In other words, the enforcement of the board independence is a solution offered to international institutional investors to avoid managerial opportunism, which is less costly than selling their blocks of shares. This leads us to make our hypothesis: Hypothesis 1.1: Board of directors' independence has a positive effect on the relationship between the IFRS adoption and the foreign institutional ownership.
The evolution of the foreign investors" number in France and the IFRS adoption can bring a true activism of this type of shareholders, too demanding in terms of information, which can change the governance structure of French firms. We are considering in what follows the relationship between the foreign institutional equity, the IFRS and the audit quality as an external governance mechanism.
IFRS, Audit Quality and Foreign Institutional Holdings
The accounts certification by the BIG4 auditors can be regarded as a signal to foreign investors in order to reduce their uncertainty on the national market. By ensuring their role of controlling the reliability of financial statements, the audit firms are involved in reducing the agency problems and limiting the managers" entrenchment (Watts & Zimmermann, 1983) . Following the predictions of the agency theory, an external auditor ijef.ccsenet.org
International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 8, No. 11; represents an agent of different users of financial information, especially shareholders. He seeks to minimize agency costs, information asymmetry and equity cost. The institutionalization of the ownership structure impacts the way of controlling the firm"s activities. In order to take investment decisions, foreign shareholders try to be informed on the firm"s situation. They need credible information before investing. The audit report is also useful because it comes from a credible source, external auditors. It represents, according to (Dye, 1993) , a firm"s performance signal, but it depends on the reputation of the auditor. Choosing an international auditor aims to signal the high quality of firm"s information. Indeed, the accounts" certification by the Big4 can be regarded as a signal to foreign investors so as to reduce their uncertainty on the national market. In this context, Abbott et al. (2004) confirmed the big firms" role in the mitigation of agency conflicts and the reduction of fraudulent information. According to Piot (2003) , when a company was audited by a renowned audit firm, it would be better appreciated by the institutional investors. In the same framework, Velury et al. (2003) as well as Kane and Velury (2004) suggested that institutional shareholders would require a high audit quality. The recruitment of an international auditor could serve as an effective mechanism to improve the quality of earnings, promote transparency, reduce information asymmetry and mitigate agency problems (Fan & Wong, 2005) . The firms wanting to show their financial reporting quality to attract institutional investors chose to be audited by the best auditors (Mitra et al., 2007) . In the Chinese context, Chan et al. (2007) confirmed that when institutional holdings grew, the demand for a high audit quality would also rise.
Abdullah (2008) stipulated the importance of institutional shareholders in the assistance of businesses. According to the same author, companies would tend to choose the BIG4 if the proportion of institutional investors went up. In Jordan, the results of Zureigat (2011) affirmed these findings. These authors proved indeed that the investors would prefer the BIG4 as high quality auditors to ensure a better quality of the financial statements facilitated their decision making. Hence, the main objective of the auditor is the verification and certification of the firm"s accounts as well as giving confidence to investors about the sincerity and the regularity of published information. Both the role and the reputation of a Big auditor has been in doubt following the unexpected bankruptcies and the major financial scandals that have occurred in the United States (Enron, Worldcom) and in Europe (Parmalat). These scandals, all around the world, have resulted in a confidence deficit in the audit mechanism. The perceived image of this governance mechanism has also been somewhat deteriorated. However, its legitimacy to preserve information quality and shareholders" interests cannot be deleted.
In other words, the audit quality is important for two reasons. First, it represents a control mechanism, which strengthens the managers" ability to act in a discretionary manner. Second, it reduces the informational risk through its role of signaling (Chen et al., 2007) . Chou et al. (2014) tried to demonstrate the importance of the auditors" choice in attracting foreign investors. Their results showed that the holdings of foreign pension funds would increase in the year following the arrival of a BIG4. Moreover, they proved that companies whose financial statements were audited by a BIG4 were able to attract more foreign investment than those whose financial information was audited by a non-BIG4. He et al. (2014) , studying the same relationship on the Chinese context, concluded that the percentage of institutional investors would decline in case of a switch to a non BIG4 auditor. According to these results, the external investors seem to enhance information quality more than their local counterparts. They require the presence of an audit of high quality to reassure them about the reliability of the disclosed reports. However, these various researches do not take into account the potential role that can endorse the audit quality, in association with the IFRS and the ownership of external funds. This leads us to make our final hypothesis: Hypothesis 1.2: Audit quality has a positive effect on the relationship between the IFRS adoption and the foreign institutional ownership.
Research Methodology
Our study is conducted on a sample of 120 Vol. 8, No. 11; favorable evolution of the French legislation. The ownership and corporate governance data are manually collected from annual reports. The financial and accounting data are extracted from Datastream. In addition, our sample should meet the following criteria: We exclude the financial institutions since they are subject to a specific regulation in terms of disclosure. Our final sample includes 97 companies corresponding to 970 firm-year observations. The non availability of certain data pushes us to work with an unbalanced panel.
Variables Description

Dependent variable
Holdings of foreign institutional investors (FII):
This variable is measured by the percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors. The IASB distinguishes a main or privileged user of the IFRS standards: an investor who needs the most critical and immediate financial information. Investors include both individual and institutional shareholders. Our ownership data are manually collected. We concentrate on the effect of the transition to the IFRS on foreign investors: pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds investing in France. 
Independent variables IFRS adoption (IFRS):
Control variables
Number of analysts (NBA): the number of analysts who follow the firm at the end of the year; Firm size (Size): the natural logarithm of total assets; Growth opportunities (GROW): the percentage of sales evolution; Return on equity (ROE): net income before dividing the extraordinary items by the book value of its own stock equity; Dividend yield (DIV): total dividend divided by the market value of equity at year-end; Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE): the ratio between the total liabilities and the total assets; Total return (TRET): DataStream total return index on the first January including dividends and all other distributions; Book-To -Market (BTM) ratio: the ratio between the book value of shares and the market value of shares at the end of the year; Earnings Price Ratio (EPR): the relation between earnings per share and the market value at year-end. In addition, the statistics show that the mean of financial analysts following the SBF 120 firms is of 18.303%. We can also observe a strong disparity between the firms, seen the difference recorded between the maximum and minimum values that vary between 2 and 36. Moreover, we note that the firms in our sample have an accounting value equal, in average, to two thirds of their market value on the whole period (BTM medium = 0.6593019). These statistics are close to those observed in the U.S. financial markets (0.669 in Florou and Pope, 2012) . In addition, our descriptive analysis covers the evolution of the ownership structure of the foreign funds over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . As depicted in Figure 1 , the post-adoption period experienced significant fluctuations. This phase knew the advent of a financial crisis in the international markets. As we can see, foreign equity was at its lowest level in 2007 and 2010. Nevertheless, during this interval of time it was high enough. Thus, despite the uniformity of the accounting French standards with the international ones, institutional investors, and especially foreign ones, remained in doubt about the placement of their considerable amounts in France. This country eventually regained their confidence, as it appears in Figure 1 . In fact, the percentage of shares experienced a peak in 2012 with 44.60555%. These findings reflect the interest of 'zinzins' to transparency and comparability concepts on which are based the IFRS. Informational requirements of these actors encourage them to invest their funds in firms adopting IFRS, including French ones, especially after 2005. Table 2 presents a mean"s comparison test. The pre-adoption and post-adoption of the IFRS periods are different. Indeed, we find a mean of shares held by foreign institutional investors significantly more important (34.55429) in the phase of adoption than in that of the non-adoption (31.04819). Such a result implies that in order to benefit from transparency, comparability, familiarity and especially from of the reduction of information asymmetry, foreign investors seek to invest in firms which apply international accounting standards.
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Bivariate Analysis
It is clear also from the comparison of the mean"s test that most of the variables vary significantly between the two periods. Thus, the overall statistics suggest that our classification criterion is valid, given that the results are consistent with the predictions in the financial literature. Indeed, the characteristics of firms that follow the IFRS are dominated by the foreign financial institutions (FII), are more large (SIZE), are more indebted (LEVERAGE), are more performing (ROE) and present the best growth opportunities (GROW). The following subsection postpones the analysis of correlations. Note. FII: Percentage of foreign institutional investors" ownership. Size: Natural logarithm of market value of equity in U.S. dollars; ROE: Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; TRET: Log of (RItþ1/RIt), where RI stands for return index on January 1st; LEVERAGE: Total liabilities divided by total assets; DIV: Dividend yield: Total dividends divided by market value of equity; BTM: Book market: Book value of equity divided by market value of equity; EPR: Earnings price: Net income divided by market value of equity; NBA: Number of analysts; Big4: Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm or their predecessors, and 0 otherwise.
Correlations Analysis
International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 8, No. 11; In order to study the associations between foreign institutional holdings, corporate governance mechanisms and control variables, we will firstly use the Pearson"s correlations matrix (Table 3) . While observing this table, we can detect a positive and significant correlation (0.0564) between our dependent variable and the variable reflecting the mandatory IFRS adoption. Thus, there is a positive effect of international accounting harmonization on the foreign investment decisions in France. The Pearson test shows also a positive significant relation between the presence of the foreign institutional investors and governance mechanisms: audit quality (0.1679) and board independence (0.131). This result confirms the predictions of the Agency theory with regard to the role of corporate governance in the resolution of conflicts of interest and the reduction of information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . This attracts investors to place a large part of their funds by observing the coefficients of the different variables. We note that they are significantly lower than the threshold of 0.8. Therefore, there are no serious problems of multi-co-linearity between our variables. We can consequently integrate them in the same model.
We examine the relationship between the foreign institutional investors" equity and the mandatory IFRS adoption in France. Hence, we test the moderating effect of corporate governance mechanisms on this relationship. The firm-level analyses employ a difference-in-difference design using data about mandatory adopters of the IFRS in France, where the IFRS are mandated (treatment sample firms), and the non-IFRS period using the following models:
In order to test the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on foreign institutional ownership following the IFRS adoption, we include the audit quality(BIG4) and board independence (BIND) variables in the first model.
The moderating effect of the audit quality and independent directors on the relationship between the IFRS adoption and the foreign institutional investors" equity is examined in the third model. The latter is an extension of the Model 1.2. Table 4 presents the results of estimated equations. We analyze the association between the adoption of financial reporting standards and foreign institutional investment on the French context as well as the moderating effect of the corporate governance mechanisms (audit quality and board independence) on this relationship. Given that we have panel data, it is appropriate to perform homogeneity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests. Once these tests are carried out, and in order to correct the problems detected, it is more sensible to work with an MCG model. The coefficients and the corresponding statistics are provided in Table 4 . This table presents the results of the three tested models. While the first one tests the direct effect of the IFRS on the equity of foreign institutional investors, the second one includes the BIG4 and BIND variables without an interaction effect. However, the last model takes into consideration the moderating effect of corporate governance by adding the interaction variables (BIG4*IFRS and BIND*IFRS).
Baseline Findings
Results Interpretation
In the following section, we try to discuss our empirical findings. Therefore, we report our baseline regression results capturing the impact of the mandatory IFRS adoption on the changes of foreign institutional holdings. Then, we operate some robustness checks.
International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 8, No. 11; the firm is audited by at least a Big 4 and 0 otherwise; BIND: Percentage of independent members in the board of directors; NBA: Number of financial analysts that follow the firm during the year t; detail: Defined by the natural logarithm of the total assets of the company; LEVERAGE: Ratio of debtto equity as measured by the ratio between the total debt and the total assets; GROW: Firm"s growth opportunities measured by the evolution of the turnover, i.e. the difference between (turnover N -turnover N-1) reported to the value of turnover N-1; LNDIV: Natural logarithm of the ratio of dividend per share divided by the market price at the end of the year; EPRI: Ratio of profit on prices measured by the report between earnings per share and the market price at the end of the year; BTM: Ratio book to market which represents the ratio between the book value of the shares and the market value of the shares at the end of the year; TRET: It represents the performance of the measured title and the gross performance of a year (including dividends and all other distributions).
IFRS Adoption Impact on Foreign Investors" Holdings
Our results support the predictions of previous works about the increase in the percentage of shares held by foreign-origin investors following the IFRS adoption, essentially in the presence of a corporate governance interaction effect. Indeed, the coefficient of the IFRS variable is positive in the 3 models (Table 4) . It is statistically significant at 1% (8.447738 with Z=1.94) in the third regression. The informational requirements of the 'zinzins', in general, and the foreign funds, especially, imply that there are naturally encouraging investments in a transparent environment, where they are not afraid that local investors are privileged in terms of information access and interpretation. Several recent papers have shown that a better quality of the published financial information allows attracting greater shares of foreign funds, apart from the context of the study. We confirm the results of Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) indicating that foreign institutional investors prefer the firms that are the richest in terms of information. In addition, we confirm the results of Bradshaw et al. (2004) , Covrig et al. (2007) and Florou and Pope (2012) who found a positive association between the holdings of institutional investors and the harmonization of international accounting. In order to consider the corporate governance effect, ijef.ccsenet.org International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 8, No. 11; we estimate the models 1.2 and 1.3. The results are analyzed above.
Audit Quality Role in the Association BetweenIFRS and Foreign Investors" Equity
The second and third columns of Table 4 represent the results of the models 1.2 and 1.3. These jointly incorporate the simple and multiplied governance variables. The BIG4 variable is positive (2.036689) and non-significant (Z=0.90) within the second model. By examining the mediating role of the audit quality such that it appears in the third column of the table, we note a positive and very significant coefficient of the variable BIG4*IFRS. The IFRS impact on the variation of institutional equity fraction depends on the presence of BIG4 auditors. This result is in accordance with the results of previous studies on the importance of an external audit. Thus it corroborates the agency theory hypothesis. The cross-border investment phenomenon is characterized by the existence of asymmetric information between domestic and foreign investors. The first are more informed than the last thanks to their better knowledge of local businesses. Foreign investors face a risk of adverse selection during the investment decision. In this framework of informational asymmetry, audit quality seems as a key factor that can help the firm to attract external capital.
IFRS impact must be enforced by some control mechanisms such as the Big4 auditors to achieve the objective of attracting foreign institutional investors. These actors are attracted not only by the characteristics of the IFRS in terms of comparability and familiarity, but also by the publication of accounting figures, free of errors and irregularities as a result of certified accounts by international auditors. Hence, we conclude for the importance of accounting standards" enforcement by other factors like corporate governance and more specifically audit quality. Indeed, these mechanisms can substitute for low legal and juridical environment, which is the case of France, to resolve agency problems. Therefore, we confirm the results of VanTendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) .
Given that investors are based on the figures disclosed by the company in their choice of investment, a reputed auditor constitutes a factor that can partially improve the allocation of external capital. Moreover, we confirm the predictions of (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Zureigat, 2011) . Our hypothesis is corroborated confirming, to the SBF 120 index, the effect of choosing a BIG4 auditor on the attraction of foreign capital. Consequently, the choice of a BIG4 represents a favorable signal for foreign institutional investors. A significant moderator effect of the audit also stipulates the importance of the IFRS enforcement in France. In fact, the IFRS may have a significantly positive impact on the equity of foreign funds, especially if they are associated with a high audit quality. The major auditing firms have a crucial role in promoting convergence.
Moderator Role of Board Independence in the Association between IFRS and Foreign Investors" Holdings
The BIND coefficient is positive and significant at 1% in the second model. We can thus say that the proportion of independent members in the board of directors is positively perceived by external investors. However, the third column of Table 4 reveals the absence of a moderating effect of this variable. It shows that this mechanism of governance has no impact on the enforcement of the relationship between the foreign institutional investors and the IFRS adoption. Indeed, our results confirm those of Setia-Atmaja (2009) with regard to the negative influence of the equity concentration on the board independence. Also, we confirm the passivity of the external directors present in the board of listed French companies. The concentration of capital is a plausible explanation for our results, as it limits the supervision power of the board (Broye & Mill, 2012) . Despite the high proportion of independent members (almost 50%), we conclude on the practical plan by the failure of this mechanism. As a consequence, we can argue that it is a presumed or formal independence. We support in the light of these results, like Densender et al. (2014) , that the main role of the independent directors is defined by the context in which the company operates.
International audit firms represent a primitive metric to the quality of information. Their independence reduces the risk of submission to external pressures. As a result, they exercise a much more effective role than that of internal mechanisms, namely the board of directors. The latter is likely to be dependent on the managers, particularly in the context of concentrated ownership where the dominant shareholder is itself a director. Therefore, we confirm the remarks of Daniels and Halpern (1996) , who stipulated in this framework that the controlling shareholder could interfere in the governance process, to wit: appointing the directors, dominating the shareholders" assembly, and even controlling the firm"s decisions. Our hypothesis about the role of the board of directors is thus rejected. Concerning the various control variables, the observed results are in general similar to our predictions. They reveal a positive and significant sensitivity at 1% of the share of foreign institutional investors to the number of financial analysts following the firm. These results reveal that external investors are attracted by firms with a high number of analysts and which are also very visible in terms of information. Besides, it is clear that the firms" performance is an important determinant of international investment decisions. Actually, the earnings price ratio is the primary criterion on which investors are based to evaluate shares. The ijef.ccsenet.org
International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 8, No. 11; EPRI variable appears very positive and significant. Unlike the expected sign, the BTM variable presents a negative sign. We can assign such a result to the fact that the BTM may contain a few measure errors, since it assumes that markets are efficient to constitute a suitable proxy of growth opportunities.
Robustness Analysis
In order to check the robustness of our results, we proceed by a reduction in the estimation period. We consider, for this, only 2 years for the pre-IFRS period (2002 and 2003) and 2 years for the post-IFRS period (2011 and 2012) . Basically, we try to provide further reassurance that our findings are not biased by our choice of an unbalanced period of study.
In other words, this will allow us to test if the choice of the same interval of time before and after the adoption of the IFRS is likely to modify our results. In addition, firms have normally acquired more experience with the use of the IFRS during the period 2011-2012. In addition we can better appreciate their adoption consequences outside of the crisis phase of 2008. Table 5 provides the results of the regressions of the 3 models reflecting the role of the mechanisms of governance in the enforcement of the IFRS to attract foreign institutional investors. the firm is audited by at least a Big 4, and 0 otherwise; BIND: Percentage of independent members in the board of directors; NBA: Number of financial analysts that follow the firm during the year t; detail: Defined by the natural logarithm of the total assets of the company; LEVERAGE: Ratio of debtto equity as measured by the ratio between the total debt and the total assets; GROW: Firm"s growth opportunities measured by the evolution of the turnover, i.e. the difference between (turnover N -Turnover N-1) reported to the value of turnover N-1; LNDIV: Natural logarithm of the ratio of dividend per share divided by the market price at the end of the year; EPRI: Ratio of profit on prices measured by the report between earnings per share and the market price at the end of the year; BTM: Ratio book to market which represents the ratio between the book value of the shares and the market value of the shares at the end of the year; TRET: It represents the performance of the measured title and gross performance of a year (including dividends and all other distributions).
We can notice that the IFRS variable is positive and highly significant, which confirms the results already found. The estimation of the model (1.2) show a positive sign, and the IFRS and BIND variables are non-significant. Nevertheless, the BIG4 variable appears very positive and significant. The third column of the table adds the confirmation of the moderating effect of audit quality on the relationship between the IFRS adoption of foreign institutional investors" equity (positive and significant sign for the interaction variable BIG4*IFRS). Thus, our results are robust against the change of the estimation period. We confirm our baseline findings related to the evolution of non-domestic institutional investors" holdings by year. The investors probably had some moments of doubt against the placement of their funds in the capital of French firms during the acute crisis phase. Nevertheless, they have won back confidence thanks to the benefits brought by the accounting harmonization, including the better comparability, transparency and familiarity.
Conclusion
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of the mandatory IFRS adoption on the ownership and decisions of foreign institutional investors. We also check the role and importance of corporate governance mechanisms on this relation. Our analyses are conducted on a sample of firms listed on the SBF 120 index during the period 2002-2012. The agency theory is the main framework. Meeting our expectations, the results demonstrate that the mandatory IFRS adoption attract foreign institutional holdings to France, which validates our principal hypothesis. In fact, the adoption of a unique set of accounting standards will undoubtedly attract foreign investors toward firms of the adopting countries. For the case of French companies, their adoption of the IFRS has inevitably resulted in a variation of their ownership structures with a massive influx of foreign investors. These actors give a great importance to information quality, thanks to accounting harmonization, so opacity is reduced and the comparability of financial statements is enhanced. They become more confident and transactions are more transparent, which facilitates decision making.
The characteristics of the firm and the institutional factors significantly influence the manner with which companies attract investors, as well as the presence of high-quality standards. In this framework, corporate governance mechanisms, mainly those relating to audit quality, complement and enforce the effect of the IFRS. Furthermore, the results indicate that the inherence of corporate governance attributes are not all efficient. The passivity of the independent board members is clear for the French companies of our sample. Our third hypothesis is not confirmed. The contextual characteristics of the French environment may justify these findings.
